Ho Chi Minh City ● Vietnam

Green tech, read from Vietnam  EN Edition

Est. 2026 · Independent · English Language

Vietnam's green tech & EV voice in English

Category: Green Economy

Green economy in Vietnam and ASEAN: carbon markets and allowances, green credits, green FDI, green exports and sustainable finance.

  • CBAM Is Now a Bill, Not a Warning: What EU Carbon Charges Mean for Vietnamese Steel

    CBAM Is Now a Bill, Not a Warning: What EU Carbon Charges Mean for Vietnamese Steel

    What changed on 1 January 2026

    For two years, the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, known as CBAM, asked exporters for paperwork. From 1 January 2026 it began asking for money. The mechanism entered its definitive phase, under which importers of iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, hydrogen and electricity into the EU must account for the carbon embedded in those goods and surrender certificates priced against the EU carbon market. More than USD 3 billion of Vietnamese exports to the EU sit inside the covered categories. For Vietnamese steel, the largest exposed product, carbon has stopped being a reporting topic for the sustainability page of an annual report. It is now a line in the export price.

    The arithmetic that matters

    The EU’s CBAM certificate price for the second quarter of 2026 was EUR 75.28 per tonne of carbon dioxide, according to Tran Ngoc Quan, head of the Vietnam Trade Office in Belgium and the EU. Producing one tonne of steel generates on average about two tonnes of carbon dioxide. Multiply the two figures and a tonne of steel carries a full carbon cost near EUR 150. Set that against an average export price of about EUR 650 per tonne, and the carbon charge at full application equals roughly 23 percent of the product’s value. No exporter absorbs a 23 percent cost wedge and stays in the same contracts. That is the number that has concentrated minds in mills from Thai Nguyen to Dung Quat.

    CBAM Is Now a Bill, Not a Warning: What EU Carbon Charges Mean for Vietnamese Steel

    Why the 2026 bill is still small, and why that is a trap

    Nobody pays the full wedge yet. CBAM phases in as free allowances for EU producers are withdrawn: the obligation covers about 2.5 percent of embedded emissions in 2026, rising to 5 percent in 2027, 10 percent in 2028, 22.5 percent in 2029, and reaching 100 percent only in 2034. A Vietnamese mill’s actual 2026 exposure is therefore a small fraction of the headline figure. Treating that as comfort would be the expensive mistake. Buyers in Europe are already comparing suppliers on the full trajectory, because contracts, furnaces and customer relationships run for years. A mill that is merely cheap in 2026 but visibly high carbon in the 2029 schedule is a supplier an EU importer will quietly replace. The phase in is best read as an investment window with a published closing date.

    Data is the first product

    CBAM charges are calculated from actual, verified emissions data where the exporter can provide it, and from EU default values where it cannot. The defaults are deliberately unkind. This is why trade officials keep repeating that measurement comes before technology. A mill that cannot state, to EU methodology, the emissions inside a tonne of its steel will be charged as if it were among the dirtiest producers, whatever its real performance. Vietnam starts from a thin base: about 2,166 facilities nationwide are subject to mandatory greenhouse gas inventories, and many exporters, especially smaller ones, have yet to build inventory systems that meet EU standards. The International Finance Corporation’s advisory team in Vietnam has made the same point from the lender’s side: without accurate measurement, a company cannot identify which production stage to fix first, prove a reduction, or satisfy banks and buyers.

    What a mill can actually do

    The levers, in the order most mills will pull them, are these. First, build the inventory: metering, emissions factors per product line, and verification that survives an EU audit. Second, cut intensity where it is cheapest, through energy efficiency, scrap based electric arc production where available, and cleaner purchased power. Third, prepare the commercial file: embedded emissions per product, stated the way an EU declarant needs them, updated quarterly as certificate prices move. There is also a domestic interaction to understand. Vietnam’s own carbon market now trades allowances at around USD 5 per tonne, and carbon prices genuinely paid at origin can be recognised within CBAM accounting. But at the gap between roughly USD 5 and EUR 75, the domestic price is a down payment, not an offset strategy. The real savings come from emitting less per tonne, not from financial engineering.

    Who wins if everyone pays

    CBAM is usually described as a cost. It is also a ranking. When every supplier to Europe faces the same carbon price, the advantage moves to whoever emits least per tonne of steel. Vietnamese producers running efficient, scrap fed electric furnaces, or able to document low intensity production, gain a measurable edge over higher emitting rivals in other exporting countries. That is the sense in which verified factory data becomes a price advantage: the mill with the better file pays less per tonne and can prove it. Trade officials in Brussels facing roles describe CBAM as a catalyst for exactly this competition. The window to enter it prepared runs to 2029, when the charge reaches about a fifth of its full weight, and closes by 2034. For Vietnamese steel, the bill has arrived. The only remaining choice is whether it arrives as a shock or as a schedule the industry has already priced in.

    Related reading

    Sources

    SGGP English, October 2026, reporting the Vietnam Trade Office in Belgium and the EU on the Q2 2026 certificate price of EUR 75.28 per tonne, the 23 percent steel cost estimate, the phase in schedule and the USD 3 billion exposure figure. Ministry of Industry and Trade reporting via Cong Thuong, October 2026, on CBAM preparation advice for Vietnamese businesses and the risk of EU default emission values. European Commission CBAM framework as summarised in October 2026 trade coverage, on the definitive phase from 1 January 2026 and the covered product categories.

  • The Rice Farmer’s New Harvest: Carbon Credits from the Mekong Delta

    The Rice Farmer’s New Harvest: Carbon Credits from the Mekong Delta

    A field that breathes

    For generations, a healthy rice field in the Mekong Delta was a flooded field. Water stood on the paddies from transplanting to harvest, and the standing water did quiet chemical work in the soil: without oxygen, microbes produced methane, one of the most potent greenhouse gases. The new harvest being tested across the Delta asks farmers to do something that feels wrong the first time. Drain the field. Let the soil breathe. Then flood it again.

    The technique is called alternate wetting and drying, and it sits at the heart of Vietnam’s programme for one million hectares of high quality, low emission rice in the Mekong Delta. In the model fields reported from Dong Thap province in September 2026, farmers ran three drainage cycles during the season, letting water levels fall well below the surface while neighbouring control fields stayed flooded as usual. The measured result was striking. Emissions from the model field were nearly one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent per hectare per season lower than the control, and the emission rate per kilogram of rice fell by half, from 0.6 kilograms to 0.3 kilograms of carbon dioxide equivalent.

    Less water, more rice

    The surprise in Dong Thap was not the emission cut. It was the yield. Farming with less seed, less fertiliser and less water is usually sold to farmers as a sacrifice made for the climate. Here the numbers ran the other way. The model field yielded 6.4 tonnes per hectare, about 1.1 tonnes more than the control plot. At a fresh paddy price of VND 6,900 per kilogram, revenue reached VND 44.16 million per hectare, and profit after costs came to more than VND 21.85 million per hectare, nearly VND 11.8 million higher than the control, or about USD 454 at VND 26,000 to USD 1. Production cost per kilogram fell from VND 5,003 to VND 3,485.

    The Rice Farmer's New Harvest: Carbon Credits from the Mekong Delta

    Provincial officials presenting the model drew the obvious conclusion: productivity, profit and emission reduction can coexist on the same field. That matters because the Delta programme will never scale on climate arguments alone. It will scale if a farmer in Dong Thap, An Giang or Kien Giang can see a neighbour earn more while pumping less water and buying less fertiliser. The carbon credit, when it arrives, is meant to be the bonus on top of a better crop, not the reason for growing it.

    A programme measured in hundreds of thousands of hectares

    The one million hectare programme, approved in 2023, is the vehicle carrying these field models across 12 Mekong Delta provinces and cities. Its stated goals for 2030 include cutting production costs by about 20 percent and raising farmer profits by about half. Reporting from a November working session in Can Tho, where the agriculture ministry met the World Bank, put the early progress in concrete terms: nearly 400,000 hectares were already being cultivated under sustainable practices, and about 20,000 hectares were set to apply formal measurement, reporting and verification procedures during the 2025 to 2026 winter and spring crop.

    Behind those hectares sits serious money. In 2024 the World Bank committed a loan of USD 350 million to support the programme. The Transformative Carbon Asset Facility has committed a further USD 20 million linked to low emission rice, and ministry officials have asked the Bank to help protect that pledge and to extend preferential green credit so cooperatives can mechanise and turn rice straw into organic fertiliser instead of burning it. A separate infrastructure proposal discussed in Can Tho would add about USD 375 million, most of it World Bank lending, for irrigation, transport, logistics and mechanisation across the programme area.

    Who actually gets paid, and when

    This is the question farmers ask first, and it is the one with the slowest answer. A carbon credit is not paid for good intentions. It is paid for a verified tonne of avoided emissions, measured against a baseline, recorded under an approved protocol and sold to a buyer. Vietnam’s agriculture ministry has built a measurement, reporting and verification protocol for rice that now serves as the legal basis for provincial use, and the pilot models in the Delta have already produced measurable reductions that could form the basis for payments. But at the Can Tho session, officials were clear about timing: the government has set 2027 to 2028 as the earliest period for allowing the sale of rice carbon credits.

    That sequencing is deliberate. Credits sold before the measurement system is trusted would fetch low prices and damage the programme’s credibility with the international buyers Vietnam wants. The intended flow of money, once sales open, runs from buyers through the programme to the farmers and cooperatives whose fields generated the reductions, with the World Bank’s carbon finance experience from the earlier VnSAT sustainable agriculture project as the template. That project raised farmer incomes by about 30 percent through more efficient water and input use and removed about 1.5 million tonnes of carbon dioxide, a stock of reductions Bank specialists have argued is ready to be monetised.

    The hard seasons ahead

    None of this is automatic. Alternate wetting and drying needs water control, which needs functioning canals, gates and coordination among neighbours sharing an irrigation block. One farmer draining while the next keeps flooding achieves little. The programme’s answer is organisation: larger fields, cooperatives and shared schedules, backed by the infrastructure investment now being prepared. Straw is the second test. Low emission rice still produces mountains of straw, and if it is burned or left to rot in flooded fields, part of the climate gain leaks away. Turning it into fertiliser, feed or substrate is where the green credit proposals come in.

    The Delta farmer’s new harvest, then, is really three harvests. The first is rice that costs less to grow and sells as a higher quality product. The second is water and input savings that already show up in the Dong Thap profit figures. The third, arriving from 2027 to 2028 if the verification system holds, is a payment for carbon that was never emitted. The first two harvests explain why nearly 400,000 hectares have already joined. The third will decide whether the programme reaches its million.

    Related reading

    Sources

    Vietnam.vn reporting on the Dong Thap high quality, low emission rice model, September 2026, on drainage cycles, yield, profit and per kilogram emission figures. Vietnam News and VietnamNet reporting on the Can Tho working session between the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment and the World Bank, November 2025, on programme hectares, MRV rollout, the USD 350 million World Bank loan, TCAF funding and the 2027 to 2028 credit sale timing. Vietnam News reporting on the VnSAT project and World Bank carbon credit estimates for rice, 2026.

  • JETP Money: Has the USD 15.5 Billion Started to Move?

    JETP Money: Has the USD 15.5 Billion Started to Move?

    What is the JETP, and what exactly was promised?

    The Just Energy Transition Partnership, known as the JETP, was agreed in December 2022 between Vietnam and an International Partners Group. The headline pledge was USD 15.5 billion, to be mobilised over a period of from 3 to 5 years. About half is public money and about half is private finance. Most of it is loans rather than grants, a detail that shapes everything that follows. A loan based package can fund large power and grid projects, but only if those projects can repay, which puts bankability at the centre of the JETP story.

    The partnership aims to move Vietnam’s power system away from coal and toward cleaner sources, while keeping electricity reliable and affordable. It is pledged finance tied to a transition plan and, in practice, to individual projects that lenders and investors judge ready to fund.

    Has the USD 15.5 billion started to move?

    Yes, but slowly and unevenly. Some flagship support has taken concrete form, most notably finance linked to pumped hydro storage at Bac Ai. At the same time, disbursement overall has been slow, and one visible early target, offshore wind, has slipped, with major international developers stepping back. One large announcement does not prove that the full USD 15.5 billion is flowing. Equally, slow early disbursement does not prove failure. JETP money moves when projects, paperwork and power purchase arrangements align, and in Vietnam that alignment has taken longer than the political announcement suggested.

    Body image for the Vietnam JETP funding analysis showing the Bac Ai pumped hydro storage project and offshore wind development in Vietnam

    What does the updated JETP plan commit Vietnam to?

    An updated JETP implementation plan was approved by Deputy Prime Minister Bui Thanh Son in 2026. It sets renewables at about 47 percent of installed power capacity by 2030. Coal capacity is capped at just over 30 GW, or 30 gigawatts. Power sector emissions are to peak at no more than 170 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent. Together, those figures describe the intended system at the end of this decade: more renewable capacity, a firm ceiling on coal, and a defined emissions peak.

    The plan also calls for two renewable energy industry and service hubs by 2030. That points to an ambition to build domestic supply chains, skills and services around the transition, not only generation assets. Beyond 2030, the direction steepens. Renewables are to supply from 80 percent to 85 percent of primary energy by 2050, and ageing coal plants are to be retired. Those longer commitments matter to investors, because they signal that policy direction is meant to last well beyond one project cycle, even where financing individual projects remains hard.

    What is the Bac Ai package, and why does it matter?

    The clearest flagship example of JETP money taking project form is Bac Ai, a pumped hydro storage project. The European Union and European actors have announced a package of EUR 430 million, which is nearly USD 500 million, for Bac Ai. Pumped hydro stores energy by moving water between reservoirs at different heights, releasing it to generate power when the system needs it. For a grid adding large amounts of solar and wind, storage of this kind helps match supply with demand across the day.

    Bac Ai also shows what a financeable project looks like when a defined asset, public backing and international partners come together around one site. If it proceeds smoothly, it offers a template for other storage and grid projects. Its progress is a practical test of whether JETP structures can deliver at project scale.

    Why do lenders keep talking about bankability?

    Reporting by Vietnam Investment Review in October 2026 identifies bankability as the key hurdle that remains. A bankable project is one whose documents, revenues and risks are clear enough for a lender to approve funding with confidence. Lenders have documentation requirements, and meeting them takes time, specialist work and consistent information from project owners. When each financier asks for a different package in a different format, cost and delay multiply.

    One response discussed in that reporting is a common project package, so several financiers can appraise the same base of studies and documents rather than separate versions. Experience from the ETEF, a finance facility referenced in the discussion, points that way. Owners also keep responsibility for their studies. International finance can review and fund, but it does not remove the owner’s duty to produce credible work on demand, costs, environmental effects and delivery. A pledge becomes a loan only after that paperwork succeeds.

    What happened to the 6 gigawatt offshore wind target?

    Vietnam had set a target of 6 GW, or 6 gigawatts, of offshore wind by 2030. That target has slipped toward 2035. The reasons are structural. Frameworks for marine surveys, for the tariff projects would receive, and for power purchase agreements, known as PPAs, have been missing or incomplete. Without confidence on price and on the contract guaranteeing a buyer for the power, developers cannot finalise investment cases for projects that cost very large sums and take years to build.

    Developers such as Orsted and Equinor withdrew in 2023 and 2024. Pilot projects were assigned to state firms instead. That shift may keep a domestic learning path alive, but it changes the financing picture, because the early international private capital that the JETP model hoped to mobilise is no longer leading those pilots. Readers should separate two questions. Is the offshore resource attractive? And is the current framework sufficient to turn it into funded projects by a given date? The evidence gives different answers to each.

    Does slow disbursement mean the JETP is failing?

    Not on its own. Transition finance at this scale was always going to move more slowly than its announcement. Loans require appraisal, and private finance requires returns and contracts that can be enforced. Vietnam is also attempting several difficult changes at once, from capping coal to building new industry hubs. Delay is a warning sign, not a final verdict.

    The fair test is whether obstacles named in 2026 are being removed. Are common project packages becoming normal? Are owners producing studies to the standard lenders require? Are the missing offshore wind frameworks for surveys, tariffs and PPAs being completed, even with a 2035 horizon? And does Bac Ai, backed by EUR 430 million or nearly USD 500 million, move from announcement toward delivery? If several answers become yes, the USD 15.5 billion will look like money that started slowly and then gathered pace. If they stay unanswered, the pledge will remain larger on paper than in the power system it was meant to transform.

    Related reading

    Sources

    VnEconomy, updated JETP implementation plan approved in 2026, reporting the capacity, coal cap and emissions peak targets. Vietnam Investment Review, October 2026, on bankability, lender documentation, common project packages and the Bac Ai package. Kurums, JETP analysis, September 2026, on the structure and progress of Vietnam JETP funding.

  • Seven Trades and 1,310 Allowances: Vietnam’s Carbon Exchange Finds Its First Price

    Seven Trades and 1,310 Allowances: Vietnam’s Carbon Exchange Finds Its First Price

    Vietnam’s domestic carbon exchange launched on 29 June 2026 on the Hanoi Stock Exchange, known as HNX. Its first session traded more than 1,200 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent at VND 130,000 to VND 136,000 per tonne, or about USD 5.00 to USD 5.23 per tonne at VND 26,000 to USD 1. That print gave Vietnam a domestic price for emitting a tonne of carbon, discovered through an actual transaction rather than set by a fee or estimated in a report.

    Then the market went quiet. In a briefing on 16 September 2026, the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment said that after more than two months, the exchange had recorded seven transactions totalling 1,310 allowances. The useful question is not whether the market is busy, because it plainly is not yet. It is whether thin trading signals weak design, a normal beginning, or a demand problem policy must solve before the first surrender deadline in 2027.

    What was actually traded

    Scale puts the opening months in perspective. More than 510 million tonnes of quota have been registered in the national system. A total of 110 facilities have been allocated quotas for the period from 2025 to 2026, in thermal power, iron and steel, and cement. In all, 92 organisations are participating.

    Body image for the Vietnam carbon exchange analysis showing thermal power, steel and cement facilities covered by emission allowances in Vietnam

    Against that backdrop, 1,310 allowances look tiny, because they are. Yet early trades in a new system often test the plumbing rather than express a strong view on price. Participants must open accounts, confirm that allowances can move, check settlement, and secure internal approvals inside a power plant, a steel mill or a cement group. A few small trades can complete that learning process at low financial risk.

    Trading method also shapes the figures. Vietnam is not running a continuous market where buyers and sellers post orders all day. Trading is negotiated, with parties agreeing terms between themselves. That suits an early market with few participants, and it produces fewer visible transactions, because no order book generates a stream of small matches.

    Two kinds of asset, two different jobs

    The system handles two asset types. Emission allowances are permissions to emit a defined amount, and they form the core of the quotas allocated to covered facilities. Carbon credits represent reductions achieved elsewhere and brought into the system under its rules. The distinction matters, because allowances set the overall cap for covered installations, while credits add flexibility about where reductions happen.

    That flexibility has a firm limit. Credits may offset up to 30 percent of an excess. A facility emitting above its allocation cannot cover the whole gap with credits. The rest must be met with allowances or by cutting its own emissions. The cap preserves an incentive for plants to improve their own performance, while still giving them a cost control tool when internal cuts are expensive or slow to deliver.

    What a price near USD 5 does and does not say

    The opening price of about USD 5 per tonne is the most quoted result of the launch, and it needs careful handling. It shows that early buyers and sellers found common ground at VND 130,000 to VND 136,000 per tonne. It does not yet show the long term cost of cutting emissions in Vietnam, the price that will prevail when surrender falls due, or the figure companies should use for investment decisions covering the next decade.

    Comparisons with much higher European prices are tempting and only partly instructive. The gap reflects different caps, allocations and stages of development, not a simple verdict that one price is right and the other is wrong. Generous early allocation, limited immediate compliance pressure and a small pool of active traders can all keep an early price low. As coverage widens and allocations tighten, supply and demand can shift. A pilot price is best read as a starting signal, not a forecast.

    The legal stack and the timetable

    The exchange rests on Decree 06 from 2022, amended by Decree 119 from 2025 in June of that year and by Decree 83 from 2026 in March of that year. Together they shape who participates, how quotas are allocated, what may be traded and how compliance is checked. For companies, that detail matters as much as the launch date, because it sets reporting duties and the consequences of holding too few allowances at surrender.

    The timetable is phased. The pilot runs through 2028. From 2029, coverage widens and allowance auctions begin. Auctions change the economics, because the state sells part of the supply rather than allocating all of it without charge. Before that, the first surrender of allowances falls in 2027. Deadlines concentrate minds in compliance markets. Trading that looks optional in a quiet pilot year can become urgent as surrender approaches.

    Demand is the binding constraint

    The central risk is demand. A market can have a venue, a registry, quotas and a legal framework, and still see little activity if participants do not yet need to buy. Facilities holding enough allowances for expected emissions have no pressing reason to trade. Facilities expecting a shortfall may wait for clearer rules or more information about how strictly the first cycle will be applied. That rational waiting can look like apathy from outside.

    Genuine demand will grow when the cost of being short is certain and near. Clear guidance on surrender, credible verification, and consistent treatment across power, steel and cement will do more for liquidity than launch publicity.

    What to watch into 2027

    Watch three signals. First, breadth: whether more of the 92 participating organisations become active, or trading stays with a very small testing group. Second, repeat business: whether participants return for second and third trades, showing that the market is entering routine compliance planning. Third, price behaviour near surrender: whether the price holds near VND 130,000 to VND 136,000 per tonne or moves as real shortages and surpluses appear.

    A steady rise from seven trades to a few dozen, spread across the three sectors, would convince more than one large transaction would. Vietnam’s exchange has done its first job. It exists, it has registered a very large pool of quota, and it has produced a first price near USD 5 per tonne. Its harder job is turning a careful pilot into a market companies must use and trust. The 1,310 allowances traded by mid September 2026 prove neither success nor failure. They become meaningful when compliance demand arrives in force in 2027.

    Related reading

    Sources

    Ministry of Agriculture and Environment briefing, 16 September 2026, on transactions, registered quota, participating organisations and facility allocations. Hanoi Stock Exchange launch of Vietnam’s domestic carbon exchange, 29 June 2026, including the first session volume and price range. Government of Vietnam, Decree 06 from 2022, Decree 119 from 2025 and Decree 83 from 2026, on greenhouse gas emissions trading and the pilot timetable.

VoltViet.

Vietnam’s green tech & EV voice in English. Green economy and clean technology from Vietnam, for a global audience.

© 2026 VoltViet · Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam

Made in Vietnam · Read everywhere